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We study the impact of transparency in a commodity market on the decision problem of a competitive firm under price 
uncertainty and hedging opportunities. Market transparency is modeled by means of the informational content of 
publicly observable signals which are correlated with the random price. We find that the impact of more transparency 
on labor employment and production depends on the firm’s technology. Inparticular, more transparency may result in 
lower average output even though on average more labor has been used in the production process. We also analyze the 
link between market transparency and the welfare of the firm. 
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 2 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
1 Introduction
The uncertainty to which decision makers are exposed in an economy depends
on the amount and the precision of information available to them. More
reliable information, e.g. about prices, technology, or market conditions,
allows a ﬁrm to make better decisions, thereby potentially improving its
position in the market. Yet, if the information is of public nature, rather than
privately owned by the ﬁrm, it will be used by other competing ﬁrms, too.
Under such circumstances the information may aﬀect endogenous market
mechanisms, such as futures prices, with wider and potentially unwelcome
implications for the individual ﬁrm.
The precision of information revealed to economic agents through an in-
formation system has recently been conceptually linked to the notion of (mar-
ket) transparency. The policy oriented literature stresses the critical role of
transparency for a strong and smoothly functioning economy (U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission (1994), Basel Committee of Banking Supervision
(1999), International Monetary Fund (1999)). While the notion of trans-
parency underlying such statements remains often vague, it usually refers to
disclosure levels and to the quality of disclosure practices of corporations and
oﬃcial bodies.
This paper suggests a diﬀerent notion of transparency for the commodity
market and analyzes its role for the decision problem of a competitive ﬁrm
under price uncertainty. The ﬁrm has access to a commodity futures market
where it can hedge the price uncertainty connected with its production of a
ﬁnal good. The terms at which futures contracts are traded depend on the
transparency of the commodity market. The notion of transparency used in
this study is adopted from the work by Drees and Eckwert (2003). These
authors have characterized market transparency using a criterion which is
conceptually related to the literature that emerged from the seminal worksPrice uncertainty, information, and hedging 3
by Blackwell (1953), Dr` eze (1960), and Hirshleifer (1971, 1975).1 The com-
modity market transparency is linked to the informativeness of an observable
signal which is correlated with the future price of the commodity. The signal
conveys some noisy information about the unknown commodity price and,
therefore, allows the ﬁrm to update its beliefs. The uncertainty to which
the ﬁrm is exposed when it decides about resource allocation for production
depends on the observed signal as well as on the information system within
which the signal can be interpreted. We characterize the goods market as
more transparent if the signal conveys more precise information about the
unknown commodity price. Thus, more transparency means that the price
uncertainty is reduced through the disclosure of more reliable public infor-
mation.2
We ﬁnd that more transparency may increase or decrease the (average)
labor demand of the ﬁrm. The impact of more transparency on labor em-
ployment and production depends on the ﬁrm’s technology. It is shown that
a better information system may result in less average output even though
on average more labor has been used in the production process. The impact
of more transparency on the ﬁrm’s welfare depends on the measure of risk
aversion and on the concavity of the production technology: if the ﬁrm is
highly risk-averse and/or if marginal productivity decreases quickly, more
transparency reduces the ﬁrm’s welfare. And if the ﬁrm is moderately risk-
averse and/or marginal productivity decreases slowly, the ﬁrm beneﬁts from
more market transparency.
1Another concept of transparency that has been used in the policy-oriented literature
is based on informational asymmetries among economic agents. According to this con-
cept, reductions in information asymmetries between policy makers and the private sector
improve the transparency of the economy (see Heinemann and Illing (2002) and Geraats
(2006)).
2In practice, this information may be disclosed by oﬃcial bodies (e.g., government
agencies or central banks), by major market participants with high public visibility, or
even through endogenous market mechanisms.4 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the ﬁrm’s
decision problem and introduce the concept of transparency which underlies
our analysis. Section 3 contains the main results and Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
We consider a competitive risk-averse ﬁrm which extends over two periods,
t = 0,1. The ﬁrm employs labor, L, as an input factor for the production of a
homogenous good in period 0 and sells its product at a random price ˜ p in t =
1. The unit price of labor is w. The tilde refers to the stochastic price which
assumes values in Ω = [p,p], where 0 < p < p < ∞. Production technology of
the ﬁrm is given by a strictly concave function f(L) with f0(L) > 0,f00(L) <
0.
As of date 0, when the ﬁrm chooses labor input, L, the future price, ˜ p, is
random. Prior to the ﬁrm’s choice a publicly observable signal y realizes.
This signal is the realization of a random variable ˜ y which is correlated
with ˜ p. Hence, the signal contains information about the unknown future
market price and, at the time when the ﬁrm chooses labor input, the relevant
expectation for ˜ p is the updated (in a Bayesian way) posterior belief.
We assume that the ﬁrm has access to a commodity futures market where
it can hedge the price risk. The futures market opens at date 0 after the signal
has been observed. A futures contract pays one unit of the commodity at
date 1. Hence the payoﬀ is worth p. Let H be the futures commitment of the
ﬁrm, i.e., H denotes the number of futures contracts sold by the ﬁrm. We
assume that the futures market is unbiased, which implies that the futures
market clears at a price, pf(y), that is equal to the condition mean of a
contract’s payoﬀ, i.e.
pf(y) = E[˜ p|y]. (1)
Both the payoﬀ and the purchase price of the commodity futures contractPrice uncertainty, information, and hedging 5
fall due in period 1. The timing of events is as follows (see Fig 1):




signal y is observed;
commodity futures market opens;
ﬁrm chooses labor L and hedging H;
the price p realizes;
all contracts are settled
Figure 1
In the next subsections, we analyze the ﬁrm’s optimal decision.
2.1 The Decision Problem of the Firm
The production decision is made after the signal has been observed, but be-
fore the commodity price is known. Therefore, the ﬁrm is subject to economic
risk. In order to hedge the risk exposure, the ﬁrm sells H units of the good
forward on the commodity futures market. The random operating proﬁt of




E[V (˜ Π)|y], (2)
where V : R → R is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice contin-
uously diﬀerentiable von-Neumann Morgenstern utility function. The ﬁrm6 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
maximizes (2) with respect to labor input, L, and future commitment H.

























From (3) and (4) we obtain the optimal level of eﬀort L∗ and the optimal
forward commitment H∗ as3
f
0(L




Equation (5) implies that the optimal level of eﬀort, L∗, is an increasing func-
tion of pf. In view of (6), all price risks are fully hedged and, consequently,
the ﬁrm’s income is certain: Π = pff(L∗) − wL∗.
Next we deﬁne our notion of transparency for the goods market. The
transparency on the market will be linked to the informational content of
the signal y.
2.2 Information Systems and Commodity Market Transparency
We identify the transparency of the commodity market with the ‘informa-
tiveness’ of the signal y ∈ Y ⊂ R, which is publicly observable.4 The in-
formativeness of the signal depends on the information system within which
signals can be interpreted. An information system, denoted by g, speciﬁes
for each state of nature, p, a conditional probability function over the set of
signals: g(y|p). The positive real number g(y|p) deﬁnes the conditional prob-
ability (density) that the signal y will be observed if the true (yet unknown)
3Condition (6) follows from (4) since, according to (1), the commodity futures market
is unbiased.
4This concept of transparency is due to Drees and Eckwert (2003). Studying issues of
international trade, these authors have applied the concept to markets of foreign currency
exchange.Price uncertainty, information, and hedging 7
commodity price is p. The function g(y|p), which generates the signals for a
given price level, is common knowledge. Using Bayes’s rule, the ﬁrm’s man-
agement revise their expectations and maximize utility on the basis of the
updated beliefs.
Let π : Ω → R+ be the (Lebesgue-) density function for the prior dis-





g(y|p)π(p)dp for all y. (7)
The density function for the updated posterior distribution over Ω is5
ν(p|y) = g(y|p)π(p)/ν(y). (8)
Blackwell (1953) suggested a criterion that ranks diﬀerent information sys-
tems according to their informational contents. Suppose g1 and g2 are two
information systems with associated density functions ν1(·) and ν2(·). The
following criterion induces an ordering on the set of information systems.
Deﬁnition 1 (Informativeness) Let g1 and g2 be two information sys-
tems. g1 is said to be more informative than g2 (expressed by g1 inf g2,), if





0 = 1, (9)









holds for all p ∈ Ω.
5To ease notation we distinguish between the functions ν(y) and ν(p|y) only by their
arguments.8 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
According to this criterion g1 inf g2, holds if g2 can be obtained from
g1 through a process of randomization. The probability density λ(y0,y) in
equation (9) transforms a signal y into a new signal y0. If the y0-values are
generated in this way, the information system g2 can be interpreted as being
obtained from the information system g1 by adding random noise. Note that
λ(·,·) in (10) is independent of p. Therefore, the signals under information
system g2 convey no information about the value of ˜ p that is not also conveyed
by the signals under information system g1. As a consequence, the a priori
posterior price uncertainty under g1 will be lower than under g2.
Our notion of commodity market transparency is based on the infor-
mational content of the signal. A signal that conveys information about
the random commodity price aﬀects the conditional price uncertainty in the
economy.6 We characterize the commodity market as more transparent if
the signal, y, conveys more precise information about ˜ p. Thus, higher mar-
ket transparency implies that the conditional price uncertainty is reduced
through the dissemination of more reliable information.
Deﬁnition 2 (Commodity Market Transparency) Let g1 and g2 be two
information systems for the random commodity price ˜ p. The commodity mar-
ket is said to be more transparent under g1 than under g2, if g1 inf g2.
The following Lemma contains a property of information systems that
turns out to be a convenient tool for our analysis. The lemma formulates an
alternative transparency criterion that is equivalent to the condition stated
in Deﬁnition 2.
6Of course, this conditional uncertainty may be hedged (partially or in full) by an
economic agent if risk sharing arrangements are available. Less conditional uncertainty
due to better information therefore does not necessarily imply that the agent is exposed
to less risk. In our model, for example, the ﬁrm eliminates any conditional price risk from
its proﬁts through trade on the futures market regardless of the signal’s precision.Price uncertainty, information, and hedging 9
Lemma 1 The commodity market is more transparent under g1 than under



















holds for every convex function F(·) on the set of density functions over Ω.
A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom (1984). Note that ν1(·|y)
and ν2(·|y) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems. Thus,
Lemma 1 implies that more transparency (weakly) raises the expectation
of any convex function of posterior beliefs. For concave functions, F, the
inequality is reversed.
In the next section we will apply these concepts to the ﬁrm’s decision
problem as described above.
3 Transparency, Production, and Welfare
Next we analyze the interaction between the input and output decisions and
price transparency on the commodity market, as well as the implications of
this interaction for the welfare of the ﬁrm. Denoting by ˆ L the average level
of labor input, and by L∗ 
pf(y)
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Proposition 1 characterizes the link between the average level of labor em-
ployed and market transparency by imposing restrictions on the production
technology.
Proposition 1 More price transparency in the commodity market leads to











.10 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
Proof: Since pf(y) = E[˜ p|y] =
R
Ω pν(p|y)dp is linear in the posterior belief
ν(·|y), Lemma 1 implies that the average level of labor input increases with
more transparency, if L∗(pf) is convex in pf. And the average level of labor
input declines with more transparency, if L∗(·) is concave. It therefore re-
mains to be shown that L∗(·) is convex (concave), whenever the term in (12)
is monotone increasing (decreasing) in L.


























w > 0. (13)
Thus L∗(·) is strictly monotone increasing. (13) then implies that L∗(pf) is
convex (concave) in pf, if the term in (12) is monotone increasing (decreasing)
in L. Note that L∗(pf) lies in the range indicated in Proposition 1, since
pf(y) ∈ [p,p].
The term in (12) captures an important feature of the curvature of the
production function. This term is decreasing, if the production function is
‘suﬃciently concave’, i.e., if marginal productivity declines quickly enough
relative to
p
−f00(L). For logarithmic technology, f(L) = 1
α log(αL), the
term in (12) is constant and equal to 1/α. In this case, price transparency
does not aﬀect average labor input. If the production function exhibits more
concavity than the log (in the above sense), then more price transparency
reduces average employment; and average employment rises with more trans-
parency, if the production function is only moderately concave (less concave
than the log).
The above proposition allows a cautious conclusion about the role of
price transparency for the labor market of an economy. Circumstantial ev-
idence suggests that marginal returns decline faster in less technologicallyPrice uncertainty, information, and hedging 11
advanced production processes like agriculture or construction, compared
with high-tech sectors such as the software or electronics industry. Proposi-
tion 1 therefore suggests that in less developed economies, which operate at
a low technological level, more price transparency may reduce the average
employment level; and in technologically advanced economies, by contrast,
more price transparency may produce positive average employment eﬀects.
Next we analyze the impact of market transparency on the average output










More transparency may either reduce or stimulate the average production
volume. Which case applies depends on the ﬁrm’s production technology.
Proposition 2 More price transparency in the commodity market leads to





is increasing (decreasing) in L.
Proof: The same reasoning as in the proof of Proposition 1 shows that the









is convex (concave) whenever the term in (15) is monotone increasing (de-






























is convex (concave), if −[f0(L)]3/f00(L) is in-
creasing (decreasing) in L.12 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
If the term in (12) is decreasing in L and, hence, average labor employ-
ment declines with more transparency, then the term in (15) is also decreasing
in L; hence, average production declines as well. Yet, it is possible that with
more transparency average labor employment increases and, at the same
time, average output declines. We illustrate this possibility by means of
our earlier example which uses a Cobb-Douglas production technology. As-
sume that the ﬁrm’s technology can be described by the production function
f(L) = Lβ. We know already that average labor employment increases with









The term in (17) is decreasing for β < 1/2. Thus, for β < 1/2 average output
declines while, at the same time, average labor employment increases with
more price transparency. In a sense, more transparency makes the production
process less eﬃcient because, on average, less output is produced with more
labor.
Thus, the results in our propositions do not necessarily conﬁrm the con-
jecture that transparency promotes economic outcome: while the employ-
ment level increases with more transparency, the production of output may
not. The intuition for this result is as follows. Under a better information
system labor employment and production react more sensitively to changes
in the signal, because the signal is more reliable.7 Therefore, with more
transparency, good signals lead to an additional increase in employment and
production while bad signals cause an additional decline in employment and
output. However, the additional employment of labor at times when good
7Labor employment and production depend on y only via the futures price pf(y). Under
a more transparent information system the distribution of pf(y) will become more spread
out: according to (1), the futures price combines the realization of the signal, y, with the
prior of ˜ p, and it assigns more weight to the signal if the signal is a more reliable indicator
for the expectation of ˜ p. Therefore, a more reliable signal leads to a futures price which is
more dispersed because it is more sensitive to the realization of the signal.Price uncertainty, information, and hedging 13
signals are observed has low marginal productivity because the production
technology is concave. Therefore the increase in output is small. At times
when bad signals are observed labor has high marginal productivity. The
decline in labor employment therefore causes a large reduction in output.
Thus, under a better information system more labor will be employed when
marginal productivity of labor is low, and less labor will be employed when
marginal productivity is high. This mechanism, which is strong if marginal
productivity decreases quickly, may result in less average output under a
better information system even though on average more labor has been used
in the production process.
We ﬁnally turn to an analysis of the welfare implications of more price
transparency on the commodity market. Deﬁne for any realization of the





















Welfare, W(g), is deﬁned as the ex ante expected utility of the ﬁrm prior to




















Proposition 3 Higher transparency on the commodity market increases wel-




whenever g1 inf g2.












∗), (20)14 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
where Λ := pff(L∗)/V 0(Π∗)[f(L∗)]2 > 0 and ε denotes the elasticity, e.g.,
ε[f,L∗] = f0(L∗)L∗/f(L∗). In view of Lemma 1, more transparency on the
commodity market increases (decreases) welfare, if ˆ V (pf) is convex (concave),
i.e., if the RHS of (20) is positive (negative).8 The ﬁrst term on the RHS
in (20) is positive since the production function is increasing and concave,
and the second term is negative due to risk aversion. These two terms re-
ﬂect the interaction between the Blackwell eﬀect and the Hirshleifer eﬀect.
The Blackwell eﬀect (ﬁrst term) represents the increase in welfare that re-
sults from the fact that the ﬁrm can make a better decision when it acts
in a more transparent environment. This eﬀect depends on the concavity of
the production function:9 if the production function is ‘very concave’, i.e.,
if the marginal productivity decreases quickly, then the Blackwell eﬀect is
small. By contrast, the Blackwell eﬀect becomes very large if the marginal
productivity is almost constant.
The Hirshleifer eﬀect captures the welfare losses that result from the
elimination of risk hedging opportunities that go hand-in-hand with more
market transparency: the futures market allows the ﬁrm to hedge against
that part of the price risk that has not yet been resolved by the signal. In
other words, the more informative the signal is the smaller is the portion of
the price risk that can be hedged. Since the ﬁrm is risk-averse, this eﬀect
reduces the welfare of the ﬁrm. The welfare loss is larger if the ﬁrm is more
risk-averse.
Summarizing, the welfare implications of more price transparency on the
commodity market are determined by the interaction of the (positive) Black-
well eﬀect and the (negative) Hirshleifer eﬀect. If the ﬁrm is highly risk-averse
and/or if the production function is strongly concave, the Hirshleifer eﬀect
dominates the Blackwell eﬀect and, hence, more transparency is undesir-
8Note, again, that pf(y) is linear in the posterior belief ν(·|y).
9In fact, the Blackwell eﬀect, −ε[f,L∗]/ε[f0,L∗], can be interpreted as a special measure
of concavity of the production function f.Price uncertainty, information, and hedging 15
able from the perspective of the ﬁrm. By contrast, if the ﬁrm is moderately
risk-averse, or even risk neutral, and/or the marginal productivity decreases
slowly, the Blackwell eﬀect is dominant. In this case the ﬁrm beneﬁts from
more market transparency.10
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have studied the role of transparency in a commodity market
for the production decision of a competitive ﬁrm. Transparency was deﬁned
in terms of the informativeness of a signal that conveys some information
about the random commodity price.
As a main result, our analysis has shown that more transparency in the
commodity market may increase the average level of labor employment while,
at the same time, the average level of production declines. Also, more trans-
parency may increase or decrease the welfare of the ﬁrm depending on a
subtle interaction between improved decision making (Blackwell eﬀect) and
less eﬃcient ex ante risk sharing (Hirshleifer eﬀect) under a more reliable
information system.
In deriving these results we have assumed that the commodity futures
market is unbiased. This assumption is quite critical and our ﬁndings cannot
be expected to be fully robust with regard to this speciﬁcation. For exam-
ple, in a biased futures market the futures price might be so low that the
ﬁrm ﬁnds it optimal to abstain from hedging altogether. In such a situa-
tion no risk sharing takes place which implies that the Hirshleifer eﬀect is
nil. As a consequence, the ﬁrm unambiguously beneﬁts from more market
transparency due to the positive Blackwell eﬀect.
10For a further discussion see Eckwert and Zilcha (2001), (2003) and Schlee (2001).16 Price uncertainty, information, and hedging
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